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by LEE HOCK LOCK 
INTRODUCTION 
Two Int r tln ents o urred ln th p t month . First, 
two days b for th N w Y . mor than 2,000 llf insurance agents 
g th r d outstd th Central Bank of Malays! in protest. They 
want d th . o m nt to uspend indefinitely the Bank's guide- 
lln to ontrol op Ung costs of Hf insurance companies. Second, 
In mid April thl y ar, the government tabled the Insurance Bill 1996 
tn lh Hou e of Repre entaU es, a hefty piece of legislation of 225 
Uon . Th pr called It the coming of stiff er regulations for the 
In u m · Ind try. A pall of gloom soon fell on the industry. There 
wu r lgn d llcnce. 
Th 










industry. Culminating in the Insurance Bill 1996, there has now 
developed a comprehensive and complex system of controls over the 
operation of insurance companies and their intermediaries. Fur- 
thermore, on top of the laws and the amendments that came every 
few years, there are other forms of regulation such as guidelines 
and circulars, from the regulator. All these taken together can be 
very bewildering to the public. 
My purpose here this evening will be try to make some sense out 
of this whole thing. We shall be dealing only with conventional 
insurers. The regulation of insurance intermediaries and the takaful 
operators must remain the topic of other lectures. 
The principal authority mpowered to regulate th insuranc in- 
du try in Malaysia since 1963 is known by dtff erent names at dif- 
ferent times of the period: Insurance Commissioner. Director Gen- 
eral of Insurance, and Central Bank of Malaysia. For simplicity, I 
shall call this authority the regulator. 
THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY UP TO 1960 
From the time when insurers first set foot in this country in the late 
18th century to about 1960, life was very simple for the insurers. 
Until 1915, there was almost complete laissez-faire. The growth of 
foreign trade increasingly raised the demand for general insurers. 
These came out via the agency houses which represented them. 
These insurers were genuinely here to do business. In any case, 
the close connection of the agency houses with London nsured that 
these insurers were well-known narn . Life In ur r w r mo tly 
patront d by th p trt t ornrnunlty. 1l\ II k of th · p trt- 
at with London f rt.h r n ur d cl tin~ nly with In ur r f 
reput . Al ontrtbutlng to th lrnpll lly or th envlronment w 1 
th b ·n or ny on umcr mov m nt th 11 to h unplou th right 










By about the early years of the 20th century, the governments of 
the day began to feel a bit uneasy about the virtual laissez-faire 
situation· for this growing financial service. Yet, they could not see 
the need to do much. And so they settled for some token legislations 
to cover only life and fire insurers. Very simple requirements were 
made under these laws. Life and fire insurers had to maintain 
statutory deposits with the authorities, provide for regular audits 
and, submit annual accounts to the registrar of companies. In 
addition, life insurers had to maintain insurance funds separate from 
their other activities and undertake actuarial investigations into th ir 
financial condition v ry five y ars. 
din th 
In l 
d In th 
Strai 
and Johore in 1934.2 Following th 
of Malaya in 1948, these 1 ws w re on olid led tnto 
of legislation for life companies and another lngl pl 
tion for fire companies." In the Borneo terrttort s, only Brtti h North 
Borneo had similar laws. 4 
RATIONALE FOR COMPREHENSIVE REGULATION OF 
INSURANCE INDUSTRY 
The laws and r gulatlon th t am ft l 60 and, p i lly ft r 
1963. ar of a dlff rent n tur . Th y int fer d with free market 
fore s. It ' ould b int tin to dwell a little on why this change 
rn d. 
Th primary rea on ts that the insurance industry belongs to 
th t pc I I l ory of financial institutions whose functioning and 
w ll-b Ing ar vital to the well-being of the nation. The industry 
with I many faclliUcs touches on virtually all aspects of daily life. 
1t I tffi ult to concctvc of an economic activity which is not de- 
p nd nt on ll. And It Is lnconce1vable for modem life to have its 









For a modem government, the choice is quite clear about the 
treatment it should accord the industry. It cannot leave the indus- 
try to sink or swim in the midst of free market forces. Too much 
is at stake and too many parties are involved, especially the multi- 
tude of consumers of insurance products. 
Shortly after the Federation of Malaya gained independence in 
1957, the government felt that the laws governing the insurance 
industry have become inadequate and irrelevant. It wanted a piece 
of legislation comprehensive enough to empower it to control and 
supervise all insurance activities so that the Federation would have 
a strong industry that would make its rightful contribution lo the 
newly emerging economy. Following a requ st made to the Au tral- 
tan gov rnment und r the Colombo Plan, an xp rt S.W. Caffin. th n 
Commonwealth Actuary and Insurance Commissioner of Australia, 
was made available to the Federation to formulate and recommend 
comprehensive legislation to regulate the country's insurance indus- 
try. On the basis of his recommendations, the Federation govern- 
ment worked out the Insurance Act 1963.5 
THE "MUSHROOM" INSURERS AND REGULATION 
As the Insurance Act 1963 was being prepared, the urgency and 
necessity for a comprehensive law of control were deeply impressed 
on the government. This was caused by the entry and proliferation 
of the so-called "mushroom" life insurance companies from the sec- 
ond half of 1960. They w re call d "mushroom" companies b caus 
they sprang up in large numb rs within hort tim , Uk mu h- 
rooms ov might. Th s "mu hroom" compant t u d ltf poll le 
at r tc of pr ·mt 111 wht h w r · not 1 tu l lolly 11 ul t d nnd wlth 
no r fi r n to th g · md h · 1UI ttu 11011 of U1 • to ur d, M eo- 
v r, th • hnd very m 11 · plt 11 re 011 'r mil llltlt or u exp rt 
n tn In. ur n bu. tn . All tht iond ·111m ct th m ·ud 
in ur r . By J mu uy l 2, \ 111 uy > "111 1 hroom" 01111~ 1111 • 









Right from the start, the government knew that these "mush- 
room" companies were heading for disaster. And so it decided to 
nip the problem in the bud. But under the existing insurance laws, 
it was totally helpless. Parliament had to pass three pieces of ad 
hoc legislation to deal with these companies. One imposed a barrier 
to entry into the life insurance industry in the form of a minimum 
capital requirement. 6 Another made it a requirement for premiums 
chargeable by a life company to be actuarially adequate and for its 
affairs to be run on sound insurance principles.7 The third empow- ~ 
ered the authorities to liquidate the .. mushroom" companles.8 All -1 
th se v ntually cl an d up th industry of th "mu hroom" ompa- 
nt s. 
The pl ode of lh "mu hroom" om Ml u~hl th f.{ v rn 
ment a good 1 on. Il d mon tr t d th t th Ung r gul t ry 
framework was an op tnvtt tton for troubl In th In urnn In 
dustry. Th t nothtng rtou ver lied U1 tndu try ov r th 
past 50 years befor the "mu hroorn" omp nl did wa m r ly 
sheer good luck and, p rhaps, also the lack of enl rprt Ing oppor 
tunists to exploit the situation. In partt ular, the "mu hroorn" aflatr 
drove home the following points: (a) Ther annot b allow cl fr 
entry into the insurance industry. (b) The ulhoriU s mu t b 
empowered to ensure proper conduct of th insuranc bu In 
• ' ....
INSURANCE REGULATION FROM 1963 
The Caffin-pioneered pie of ompreh n iv legt latlon, the Insur- 
an A t 1963, b cam I ' o emtng all insurance activities from 
l 63. At hort tnt during the next 33 years, amendments 
w r mad lo thi Act. man extending significantly the scope and 
dlr ti n of r gul Uon. In mid-April this year, the Act and all its 
m ndmen ha e been tidied up, rewritten, augmented, rearranged, 
lib raltzed in some aspects, tightened up in others and, presented 
w th Insurance Bill 1996. In addition to the law, there are 
th · m y guideline and the circulars which supplement it. All the 









mg up of a regulatory framework for the insurance industry that 
today has touched on almost all the important aspects of insurance 
operations. 
It is not possible for this evening's lecture to deal with all the 
regulations that have crept into the law, guidelines and circulars. 
There are too many of them. l propose to discuss only what I con- 
sider the five most important areas the post-1963 regulatory system 
has focussed upon. These are: 
1) Barriers to free entry into the insurance industry. 
U) Insurer solvency. 
iii) Other m asures towards afe and ound In ur rs. 
iv) Safeguarding the rights of consumers of insurance prod- 
ucts. 
v) Public policy through insurance regulation. 
(f) Barriers to Free Entry into the Insurance Industry 
Possibly the most fundamental measure of control imposed by the 
Insurance Act 1963 and its amendments ts the putting up of barri- 
ers to free entry into the industry. It takes the form of a require- 
ment for all who wish to undertake insurance business in Malaysia 
to be registered. When the Insurance Bill 1996 becomes law, licens- 
ing will replace registration but the effects will be the same. 
Registratton efTectlvely puts an end to fr e ntry into th insur- 
ance industry. Sine 1963, two typ of on id r tlon ov rn th 
r gt tration of an in ur r: 
a) tt abtltty to rn ·rt un u 110 · 1Uo11 ; ind 
b) th· n uur or Ill p1 v llluf.{ poll<:y con lltton , 
P rh p, th mo; t Imp rt ml of the qu 1111\ 111011 or ·nhy I brln~ 
bl to m I th mtntmum 1pll 11 •qulr xnenl. H w 1 l~M I mllllon 









for both classes of business. These sums are small by today's stand- 
ard but they were substantial in those days. They have been raised 
substantially since then. Coming 12 years later was the require- 
ment to maintain a solvency margin - but more of this later. With 
certain exceptions, the entrant would have to be either a registered 
company or a co-operative. However, all insurers will have to be 
public companies when the Insurance Bill 1996 becomes law. These 
qualifications have successfully shut out the pseudo insurers. 
There is little documentation about the policy environment gov- 
rntng r gtstration that exist d in th pa t 33 y ars but from what 
may b gath r d, th following hav b n important poll y on Id- 
ration 
a) Th re wa a deflntt poll y to fo t r and n our g Jo l 
insurer . p I Jly from th 1 70 . A I l 72, 
80 of th 93 r gl l r d In ur rs (8 %) w r for lgn- In· 
corporat d. 
b) The New Economic Policy was Imp! m nted In th In- 
surance industry from 1975. Th Poll y ha ert In r 
quirements on equity for th Burntputra ommunlty, 
other Malaysians and, for lgn rs and th s h v b n 
an inhibiting factor. 
c) The insurance industry ' s on id r d by th r gulat r 
to b o er-crowded, a 1 t a 19 O. WIU1 th t, 
th poll wa to r gt t n w omparues. unles 
p i 1 r quir m nt such as for foreign 
r n ur 
d) Th r gul tor decided that the locally-incorporated com- 
pante and those that emerged from restructuring under 
th Ne' Economic Policy be given a fair period of time 
to consolidate and grow. This was another reason to 










(ii) Insurer Solvency 
The maintenance of insurer solvency can be regarded as the pri- 
mary reason for regulation. An insurer receives premium payments 
from a policyholder today in return for its promise to pay benefits at 
some future date - as when the risk insured against materializes 
or when the policy concerned matures. The value of this promise 
depends wholly on the Insurer's ability to pay when the time for It 
comes I.e. it depends on the Insurer's solvency. 
An Insurer will fail to meet this obligation If it becomes insolvent. 
This can give rise to very serious consequences for the Insured, their 
dependents or persons in a third party. Furthermore, insolvency 
must also mean the end of the road for an Insurer as it can con- 
tinue to exist only on the fragile confid n of the public in its ablltty 
to deliv r on its promises. Even more ertous, a -Iallur by on 
in ur r to meet its ltabtltties can cause widespread anxieties and 
ev n loss of trust among the public In Insurers as a whole. In 
extreme circumstances, runs on insurance companies have been 
known to occur just as there have been runs on banks.'? All these 
consequences of Insurer Insolvency can cause irreparable damage 
to a nation's economy in view of the widespread role of Insurance in 
modem life. 
Fundamental though the Issue of insurer solvency ts for insur- 
ance regulation, it may come as a surprise that in Malaysia signifi- 
cant measures to promote Insurer solvency came rather late - 12 
years or more after the Insurance Act 1963. 
In 1975, the most conspicuous of the solvency measures was 
introduced - the solvency margin. The use of the solv ncy margin 
rests on one simple prtnctpl nam ly, that it I not ufficl nt for an 
in urer to b ju t olv nt I. . to b in a Itu Uon wh r it h ju t 
nough a t t rn ·t II II bllltlc . Th lv ·n y rn 1fgt11 r ·qutr ·, 
th t n In ur ·r hould h iv 1 p • (fl d mnounl of :m1plt1 of (I s •I. 
ov r II JI 1bllllt 11 111 11111 • • Tilt I lo p 111111 11ppwp1I11 1< Ilou 
to b th n tu I olveu •y of the In 11 • I ·n I ngt·1 d. 









Without going into details, the prescrtbed solvency margin is based 
on the minimum capital requirement (or, for foreign insurers, the 
prescribed surplus of assets over llabllltles in respect of their 
Malaysian business). From 1978, an attempt was made to relate 
the size of the margin for a general insurer to the volume of the 
insurer's business as reflected by its premium income but the capi- 
tal requirement (or the surplus for foreign insurers) remained the 
minimum. The Insurance Bill 1996 envisages the imposition of a 
separate solvency margin for each class of insurance business to 
take account of the large differences between life and general insur- 
ance. 
Insur r solv ncy n eds con tcmt monitoring by th r gulator. 
Re ular in p cUon of In ur r and p !al Inv 'Ligation ar th 
mean u d f r thl purpo ' . How v' , th r wn n I gal provt I n 
for r gular (n p Non of In ur ·r In Mal I unttl l . B I dur- 
ing th p rtod 1963- , th r gul tor h d p w r t r qutr n In- 
sur r to provide him with ny Inform ill n p rt lntn~ t u bu I 
n ss. On th oth r hand, th pow r t und rt k n p I I Inv , 
tigatton were alr ady In pl e by 196 . Anyw y. lhl I not U1 
same as having powers for regular in p Uon . 
The nature of the reinsurance arrang rn nt of an in ur ·r an 
determine its risk exposures and h n e it olv n y. It w only 
from 1975 that the regulator wa empov r d to Insp l th ad qua y 
and appropriateness of an insurer's r ln uran arrang rn nts and 
to tender advice. The Insurance Bill 1996 ' ill nub! lh r gul tor 
to go further namel , to requlr an In ur r to r Ufy an sh rt rn- 
tngs in its rein uran arran m nts, 
b n d ontinu to be a problem area in 
to promot . By It elf, the process of claims reserv- 
lr dy t hnt difficult and subjective. But on top of 
y tan in urers ' ere found to practise improper claims 
nd om un rupulous insurers were noted to have abused 
pro . To mak for better claims reserving practices, two sets 
of uldcllne ha e been issued by the regulator to all insurers.11 










require insurers to undertake additional actuarial evaluations to assist 
him in his supervision work here. 
Finally. the Malaysian insurance law has been equipped with 
certain provisions not commonly found in solvency regulations else- 
where. These provisions recognize that insolvent insurers are not 
total "write-offs" and that every effort should be made to rehabilitate 
them, if possible. These provisions, which became available from 
1991, offer two sets of actions that may be taken by the regulator. 
The first set operates largely within the framework of an insolvent 
insurer's management. It may entail an order to the insurer to 
cease certain activities or it may require the removal of certain 
employees and/or directors coupled with their replacement by oth- 
ers. The second set of actions entails a total chang in th insol- 
vent insurer's management. Here th r gulator or his appointee will 
assume control of the insurer and carry on its bu ih s until a turn 
around has been effected. In lteu of this. the regulator may apply 
to the High Court to appoint a receiver or manager to manage the 
whole or a part of the insurer's business. 
Two insolvent general insurers have been put under these reha- 
bilitation provisions in 1991. These were the Mercantile Insurance 
Sdn Bhd and Pan Global Insurance Sdn Bhd, the largest and sec- 
ond largest motor insurers respectively. Mercantile Insurance Sdn 
Bhd was taken over by the regulator but it still went under because 
its shareholders refused to inject the required fresh capital to cor- 
rect its huge solvency deficiency. Pan Global Insurance Sdn Bhd 
was merely subjected to a revamp of its management and was sal- 
vaged. 
(Uf) Other Measures towards Sqfe and Sound Insurer 
Whll m a ur 
for all r gul t ry 
o I l th d V"I pment o 
g n r 11y. Mo, of th 
th m [or C u 
o h ~ ·n I 1kt:11 t 
\ Iron"' 111 I hr 111 hy 111 lit in ludu It 










vency regulation, only emerged many years after the Insurance Act 
1963, prompted no doubt by the experience gained and the rise of 
fresh problems in the industry. 
Among the measures to promote safe and sound insurers, possi- 
bly the most significant are those that contribute to the develop- 
ment of management of competence and integrity for each insurer. 
It has often been found that a common cause for the problems of 
troubled insurers has to do with poor or dishonest management. In 
Malaysia, formal attention was accorded to ensuring management of 
competence and integrity for insurers only about 15 years after the 
Insurance Act 1963. 
The following are dev lopm nts toward thl end: 
a) From 1978, th r gulator' approval I r qulr d for ap- 
p lntm nt of mun nn dlr l r. dlr or. prtn Ip f- 
r di qu II ytn hold- 
r of u h appotntm nt I tn d and 1 Id down 
from 1983. 
bl From 1978, th r gul tor wa mpow r d lo all on an 
insurer to remove m mb r of ll nlor 
management if he consider d th t it manag ment w 
conducting Its busin s In a d trim ntal mann r. r m 
1991, the regulator's pov r w r enhan d wh n h 
can from then on dire ti remo and 
replace them by others. Alternati tor or 
his appointee ma dlr ti bu I- 
n s and run it until th not d 
earlt . 
By th arly l 90 . th regul tor has commenced to 
Imp an nnu 1 minimum exp nditur target for staff 
inln on all insurers, this being l % of an insurer's 
\ bill In 1990 and rising to 4.5% In 1994. 
M ur s to promote .financial prudence among insurers constt- 









surers. Besides being exposed to risks from liabilities arising from 
its insuring activities, an Insurer is also exposed to another impor- 
tant source of risks namely, those arising from the manner it In- 
vests the resources of the insurance funds. From 1975, the regu- 
lator was empowered to ensure that the assets held in the insur- 
ance fund of an insurer are safe, suitable and stable. 
First, from 1975, an insurer may be prohibited from making in- 
vestments of certain types or it may be required to realize a part or 
the whole of such investments. The availability of this power should 
help to avoid undesirable situations such as in the U.S. where many 
insurers invested large amounts in junk bonds. Second, from 1978, 
important restrictions have been imposed on loans and advances 
made from insurance funds. These restrictions are to ensure that 
such loans and advances are well secur d; that the insurer's own 
shar s are not used as s curity; and that the loans and advances 
are not channelled to the insurer's own dlr ctors, dtrector-tntere ted 
companies and, companies related to the insurer. 
Another area of prudential control entails the introduction of meas- 
ures to ensure the security of the assets in Insurance funds - that 
they are kept separate from other assets; are not mortgaged or 
pledged: and are in proper and accessible custody. Most of these 
requirements came after 1975. 
Finally, the regulator has been compelled to .take direct action to 
control cost.s in recent years to foster a more safe and sound insur- 
ance industry. Two major items of expenditure of insurers have 
engaged the attention and concern of the regulator. These are com- 
mission payments and management expenses. 
The payment of high commissions to agents has long been used 
by insurers as a major means to appropriat for th mselves an In- 
er astng har of the market In ctor wh r • comp uuon ha b n 
fl ·r •. In ltf In uran , lh r w ol o lh probl m rl tng from 
the manner ommt ton h v b n p Id wht h did not n ·oumg 










The industry itself recognized the need for joint action among the 
insurers themselves to deal With the issue of commission payments. 
But the results of such joint actions taken in the 1980s have been 
limited. On management expenses, the insurers did not act. But 
the regulator considered that these were unduly high and merited 
action. 
In view of these, the regulator decided to intervene directly via 
guidelines to control both commission payments and management 
expenses. It felt that more reasonable and realistic levels for both 
of these major items of expenditure are prerequisites for a strong 
industry. The first of these guidelines, issued in 1990, was directed 
at the general insurers.12 The second of these, lssu d in late 1995, 
was directed at the life Insur rs.13 Th latt r au d th vo I~ rou 
demonstration of llf ag nt outstd the Central Bank v n month 
ago but the authonue h v r maln d firm. 
.... - , .... 
(iv) SqfeguardLng the Rights of Consumers qf Insurance 
Products 
,,,, .. z 
..) 
.. . 
Consumers of insurance products in Mal ysta, sp tally Indtvtdu- 
als, are a disadvantaged lot when these are array d again l Insur- 
ers. They are not organized and hence they h v n ver b n for 
of much influence. This situation is further aggrav led by th lack 
of a strong consumer movement in the country. Th in uran el w 
that were enacted from early this century to 1962 paid no r gard 
whatsoever to consumers' rights. What er rights th poli yhold r 
have enjoyed then were those ac orded to th m by th ln ur r n 
their own volition and in the manner th y , w fit. 
The Insurance Act 1963 wa a turning point. For the first time, 
prote tion of policyholders' rtghts was written in the insurance law 
of the ountry. Admittedly, the areas initially covered were few. 
Th c hav inc then been considerably augmented by the various 
mcndmen to the Act that came after. Furthermore, the Insur- 














It would be too time consuming to examine each of the measures 
for consumer protection individually. Suffice it for me to indicate 
the broad areas into which the provisions have developed. As of 
today. six broad areas of consumer protection have found their way 
into the regulatory framework. 
(a) Towards Fairer Terms for Consumers in Insurance Contracts 
Insurers always have the upper hand over policyholders when it 
comes to insurance contracts. ln many countries. laws have there- 
fore been passed to safeguard the rights of the weaker policyholders 
and Malaysia has done likewise beginning with the Insurance Act 
1963. 
There are now provisions to sq.feguard policyholders againSt .fi- 
nancial losses . . enUUem nt to a surr nd r valu for 11~ poli 1 
aft r a sp ctf) d period; non-forfeiture of a poltcy after it has been In 
force for a minimum period; entitlement to conversion to a paid-up 
life policy: etc. Furthermore. there are now also prouistons to protect 
a policylwlder against avoidance or cancellation of his policy on 
grounds of inaccurate or questionable information supplied, under 
certain circumstances. A third category of provisions accords a ltfe 
policyholder the right to return a policy he finds unacceptable shortly 
after issue and to get a refund of the premiums paid. 
(b) Preveniinq Exploitation of Consumers of Insurance Products 
Consumers of insurance products face possible exploitation in the 
insurance market. There have now been introduced measures to 
minimize the use of false or d c pttv m an by in ur r or th Ir 
int rm dtarl ' to lndu e pur has of U1 ·fr produ t . Anoth r p 
f rn ia ur • h b • n lnlr du id t prot • t U1 • 111 11 nd un 









(c) Ensuring Reasonably-Priced Insurance Products 
Prtces of insurance products have strong public interest elements. 
Most obvious are the compulsory insurance policies required by law 
to be taken by certain groups e.g.: third party motor insurance and 
insurance for workmen's compensation. Since 1963, the Malaysian 
regulator has taken upon himself the task to arbitrate on the fair- 
ness of prices of general insurance products to consumers as well 
as their implications for insurer solvency, whenever there have been 
proposals to raise premiums. Over the past 33 years, approval for 
changes in premium rates was granted only once each by the regu- 
lator for the motor and fire sectors. Consumer Inter st was evi- 
dently an Important consideration. 
(d) Ensuring AvaUabUittJ of In uranc Cov r for All 
Rate regulation how ver h gtv n ri to pr bl nu 
insurance cover for 11 In th motor In uran 
the continually rising laim tlo nd oth r o t In U1 motor • t r 
have generally made motor Insurance an unattra trv Un of bu 1- 
ness and this further aggravated the problem of upply. All the 
were manifested in the following form : diffi ulli • of hl~h rt k 
vehicles getting cover; unreasonable or arbitrary loading on pr ml- 
urns: and, insurers reducing or a aiding In olv ment with motor 
insurance business. 
To ensure availability of co r for all at r gulat d pri . lh 
regulator was forced to r gulat en mor : ttln in ur r r 
lzed into high ri k motor in uran pool: ontrolltng Insurers· 
loadin s on premium via idelin s; 1.. and, sine 1991. compelling 
sel ct d in urer to Iner th r motor business by a specified 
p r nta . 1~ But u h me ur s at ensuring availability of cover 
b vi ble only t mporarily. The real solution must rest in con- 










(e} Minimizing Problemsfor Users of Insurance Products 
Consumers of insurance products often face a wide range of prob· 
lems in their dealings with insurers. Many insurers have found tt 
convenient to overlook or are msenuuve to the situation and needs 
of the small policyholders or their beneficiaries. 
Possibly the most notable measure here was when the regulator 
undertook on a formal basts to receive and examine all complaints 
from policyholders and the public about their dealings with insurers 
and to take appropriate action where necessary. These complaints 
may touch on matters such as delays in settling claims, rejection of 
claims without valid reasons, delays in approving repair work on 
damaged vehicles, etc. 
Anoth r notabl m asur tak n nables paym nt of poll y mon- 
ys by tn ur rs to beneficiaries of mall poltcl without prob t or 
lett rs of administration. 
(j) Compensating Policyholders and Other Claimants of Insolvent 
Insurers 
Not many people are aware that a fairly satisfactory legal framework 
ts already in place since 1975 to provide for funds to be set up to 
meet the liabilities of insolvent insurers. These are the insurance 
guarantee scheme funds for general and life insurance business. 
There are provisions to limit the amount of payment and the catego- 
ries of eligible claimants. The funds were originally intended to be 
financed by levies on all insurers but from 1994, it has become 
possible to tap other sourc s of funds e.g. borrowings. 
So far such a fund has b n stabllsh d only for g neral Insur- 
·r , lh r ·o on b ·Ing po lbly b au · In olv n y h s tcd only 










(v) Public Policy through Insurance Regulation 
There ls one other important development. Since 1963, insurance 
regulation in Malaysia has also been used as a means to implement 
certain goals of public policy. Three areas may be identified: 
a) Assisting in domestic financing of the economy. 
bl Implementing national policy on ownership and control; 
and 
c) Fostering a robust and mature domestic insurance in- 
dustry. 
In connection with the first area, ll should be not d that in ur- 
ance companl ar not m r ly uppller of lnsuranc rvtc . Th y 
ar also mobtliz r of fund 1n th our of providing th rv- 
tee . Th · fund b om ub L 
pand. Wh n S.W. Caffin ludt d th 
found that virtually the who! of e h In urun 
in foreign as ets.18 H th n m d on ry Imp rtant r ornrn nda- 
tion which was accept d by the govemm nt. H all d for a m l h 
Ing of all local liablltties of insurance fund wilh lo al a 
pace to be determined by the availability of uttable local a s t .17 
Though the underlying rationale for this r ommend Uon wa bn I 
cally for prudential reasons, 1t meshed in perf ctly with th g neral 
policy of the young Federation go emment lo Induce mor dom ti 
use of the funds mobilized by the country's Ilnan lal In lltuUon . 
Thus, when the lnsuranc Act 1963 wa na l d. in ur r w r 
requtr d to in st at 1 st 55% of th lr in uran fund in p Ill d 
local a sets by 1966. Over th ars, this minimum proportion has 
been ra1 d: to 75% by the d of 1972 and then to 80% by 1975. 
Th point I th t th ontmutn a ptanc of this principle will in 
th our of tlm 1 d to a channelling of all funds mobilized by 











Then came a measure of even greater significance for domes- 
tic financing. Insurers were directed to Invest a specified portion of 
the resources of their Insurance funds In medium and long-term 
Malaysian government securities. It is w 11 known that proceeds 
from these securities are used to finance the country's public devel- 
opment expenditures under the five-year development plans. The 
developmental benefit of this measure ts therefore even more. 
Initially, insurers were required to hold at least 20% of their 
insurance funds in Malaysian government securities from 1972. This 
proportion was then raised to 25% from 1982. 
The Insurance Bill 1996 is silent on the continuation of these 
two requirements but it still confers on the regulator the power to 
require insurers to Inv st th Ir funds in su h a rnann r or ln u h 
a place as it may pr rib . 
The s cond ar a in uranc r rul Uon In Mal y ta h be n u d 
to glv xpresston to public policy ts on ownership and control. As 
a means to deal with the long-standing problem of economic Imbal- 
ance among racial groups, the New Economic Policy was Implemented 
during 1971-90. The Policy has two objectives, the first being to 
eradicate poverty among all Malaysians and the second being to 
restructure society to eventually removing the present identification 
of race with economic function and location. Efforts to pursue the 
second objective entailed, among other things, the restructuring of 
equity ownership in the modem sectors and the restructuring of 
employment. 
The pattern of equity ownership in the insurance industry in the 
early 1970s was sharply unbalanced, as elsewhere, with negligible 
holdings by the Bumiputra community, low holdings by other 
Malaysians and, very substantial holding by for tgn rs. And o, 
b gtnnlng from l 75, qulty r lru urtng l rg l und r th oll 
w r trnpo ·d on lh · Indu try n l omp my r I , th · · b In r 30% 
f th In ur ·r' t t 11 qulty fo Ih • umiputr omrnuntty, lib f r 
otlH'r M 11 ty I in incl aO)i(i or fo t'l~n l11lt· e t , 'I h • requlr nucut 









95, a total of 43 branch offices of foreign insurance companies have 
restructured into 33 locally-incorporated companies which gave cog- 
nizance to the targets on equity under the Policy. Eight more for- 
eign insurers remained to be restructured and they are working 
towards it. 
Control may also be exercised via employment and the New Eco- 
nomic Policy also sought to alter control through employment re- 
structuring, particularly at the managerial and supervisory levels. 
Focus was directed at the employment of Bumlputra individuals which 
have been under-represented in the insurance industry. However 
progress here has not been too encouraging with regard to the 
managerial and supervisory cat gories but there has been a notable 
increase of Bumlputra staff generally. 
Th Insurance Bill 1996 will lntrodu furth r ontrol ov r own- 
ership of tnsuranc compante wh n limits will b s t on lh tz of 
shar holding . Thi I to prev nt domln Ung and und Ir bl· h re 
holders. 
Fostering a robu t and matur in ur n Indu try n tttut 
the third area tnsuran r gul uon h b n u d for publl poll y 
purposes. Three objectlv s may b Id ntlfl d h r . Th mo t obvi- 
ous is to give all encouragement and help to tile growth and an- 
ston of the domestic insurers. These hav m rged ln significant 
numbers only from 1975, assisted no doubt by the N •w E onoml 
Policy. The second objecti e concerns the n eel to deal wtth a long 
standing weakness of the industry namely, the tend n y of In ur r 
to send out large portions of their pr mlum 1n om abroad for 
reinsurance purposes. Tuer ha b en provision introdu d In 
the law to compel local 1n urers t und rwrit mor of th rt k 
u ually r tnsur d abroad. Sin e 1 75, hip and aircraft regtst r cl 
in Malaysia and prop rty lo t d tn Malaysia have been required to 
b In ured with tn urers within th country unless otherwise per- 
mitt d. Th In uran Bill 1996 will add to this list the insurance 
or nrd party If btliti or residents 1n Malaysia. The third objective 









to handle large and specialized risks. To this end, guidelines have 
been issued in 1993.18 But much more remains to be done. 
SOME BROAD OBSERVATIONS ON INSURANCE REGULATION IN 
MALAYSIA 
Having examined these major developments in the regulatory frame- 
work for the Malaysian insurance industry, perhaps there is one 
more thing I should do before I wrap up this lecture. Let me share 
with you some of my thoughts and observations about this whole 
question of insurance regulation in Malaysia. 
a) First, allow me to deal with the question everyone will now 
be wanting to ask following the adv nt of th Insuranc Bill 
1996: "What else can w expect to see in th future?" H r 
l think your answer is as good as mine. But l am sure 
almost very one here will agree with me lhat the r ally 
Important provisions for regulating insurers are already in 
place. We now have a sufficiently adequate regulatory frame- 
work. I do not see any justification for major additions in 
the foreseeable future. 
b) Second, notwithstanding that statement, I believe some im- 
portant changes will still have to be made to the regulatory 
framework. I refer to the need for some fine tuning to be 
applied to the framework. One change that needs to be 
made as soon as possible concerns the solvency margin. Our 
earlier discussion has indicated that the solvency margin for 
life insurers is not yet tied to the volume of business of the 
insurer. This is a major omission. To correct the situation, 
we may r late the r quired solvency margin for a life Insur r 
to its total ass ts. Total a s t of th lif in ur r would b 
a mor uttabl basl for r f r en than pr mtum In om · in 
vt ·w of th · long r t .rm nut 11· • of lh · llf · u tn . P rh p , 
v n rnor Imporlnnt I th 1t rrlon rem Ider uton b Iv ·n 









margin as a regulatory instrument for all insurers. The 
magnitude of the solvency margin should be related also to 
the risks borne by each insurer. In other words, an insurer 
exposed to higher risks should be required to maintain a 
larger solvency margin. 
Third, from a reasonable man's point of view, there are al- 
ready enough legal powers for the regulator to do much. 
But the availability of extensive legal powers for the regula- 
tor is one thing. A regulator having also the necessary 
expertise and manpower to effectively use these powers Is 
another. Among other things, the Malaysian regulator does 
not appear too strong in the area of regular inspections and 
special investigations of insurers. Early warning lgnal 
app ar to have b n oc tonally ml d. For ampl . th 
ca e of th M r antile In urance Sdn Bhd and Pan Glob I 
In uranc Sdn Bhd r v al d th l th Ir in olv n I · w ·r · l 
a fairly advanc d la l. 
Perhaps. the regular In p Uon hnv not b n rt d ut 
at close-enough fr qu ncy and d pth. Th point I th 1l Ht r 
have not b en enough experien d miner In r lauon to 
the number of insurers. It would al o b h lpf ul If lhe r gu- 
lator can develop and use early warning Indicators to moni- 
tor the financial conditions and problem of In ur r In 
between the regular inspections. 
Fourth, sometimes it appears that the r gulator ls b ing pre - 
sured to achie e too much at one go and thl h r suited 
in the imposition of e en mor r gul tlon at lh nd of th 
day. A good example Is what th r gul tor tt rnpt d In U1 
motor insurance s tor. It has tri d to regulate on 
affordability and o ts at the sarn time. When a cap has 
b en put on pr mtum prices and the efforts made at con- 
trolling o ts wcr low in showing results, problems on the 
availability of insurance cover for all became inevitable. As 
on equence, th regulator had to introduce more regula- 










lected insurers to underwrite more motor policies; etc. But 
these latter measures cannot be a lasting solution. In situ- 
ations such as these, it would be better if the regulator can 
insist and operate on the basis of a more realistic set of 
priorities to govern the types of action to be taken. 
e) Fifth, the process of regulating used so far can certainly do 
with more participation by the industry. There should be 
more and closer consultation between the regulator and the 
industry; more transparent revelation of the regulator's in- 
tentions; and more willingness on the part of the regulator 
to take the industry into its confidence. Apparently these 
conditions have not been met in many instances. The most 
recent example has been the tabling of the giant Insurance 
Bill 1996 in th House of R pr s ntatrv s in April. Th 
industry was generally aught by urprts by ome of th 
provi ton in the B111. And th re wa no hint v n In the 
latest annual report of the regulator issued In March this 
year that such a hefty Bill was on the way. I believe that 
more involvement of the industry in the regulatory process 
will lead to more effective regulations and, just as impor- 
tant, to better compliance. 
f) Finally, it seems to me that we are fast approaching the 
point of very heavy regulation for the insurance industry. 
Today, the regulator's presence can be felt almost everywhere 
in the industry. For many years now, insurers have been 
subjected to legislation of rapid and unending growth. When 
the Central Bank of Malaysia became the regulator from 
1988, there was added to the expanding legislation a grow- 
ing list of guidelines and circulars which are in effect exten- 
sions of the law. Und niably, many urg nt and important 
matters about the industry ar b In 1 tak n ar of by all 
th t th r ar • ertnlnly ctn r m tt r whl h sh uld 
·tl ·r I ·ft lo lh to rr ·r th im Iv r whl h 










Regulation ts costly business for both the regulator and the regu- 
lated. It ts not the case of the more, the merrier. And tt ts needless 
for me to also add that there must be enough room given to the 
industry to allow for creativity and innovations. Therefore, for the 
good of the industry. a fresh approach to regulation appears neces- 
sary for the coming years. Efforts should commence as soon as 
possible to work towards a regulatory framework that will be more 
selective. But this ts likely to be one of the hardest tasks we can 
ever ask of the regulator. Recent experience has not been encour- 
aging. The regulator has done very little in this direction although 
tt was presented with a great opportunity when the Insurance Bill 
1996 was being worked out. 
FOOTNOTES 
'The e re: Ufe In ur n e Comp I Ordtn n p 15 ): 1..1 
Assurance Companie En ctment 1924 (FM C p 0): nd Life As ur n e 
Comparues Enactment 1934 (Johore En ctment No. 129). 
~ese are: Fire Insurance Compantes Ordln n p l 2): Fir 
Insurance Companies En tment 1918 (FM C p 5 ): nd, Fir In ur n 
Companies Enactment 1934 (Johore En ctrnent No. 130). 
3These are: Life Assurance Companies Ordman e 1948 nd Fire In uran e 
Companies Ordinance 1948. 
4'I'hese are: Life Assurance Companies Ordlnan e 1951 (North Bom o p 
71) and Fire Insurance Companies Ordinance 1951 (North Borneo Cap 46). 
5See S.W. Caffln, Report upon Insurance Legislation for the ~ d ration of 
Mala.ya. Canberra, Commonwealth Government Printer, 1960. 
8Llfe Assurance Companies (Amendment) Act 1961. 
'1Ll.fe Assurance Act 1961. 
8Ufe Assurance (Compulsory UquJd tlon) Act 1962. 
9See Annual R port of th Director Gen ral of Insurance: 1975, p. 43 and 
19 0, p. 193. 
10A run on an In urer an take the form of a very large number of policy- 
holder goln for urrenders of policies and policy loans as well as allowing 










11niese are "Guldeltnes on Accounting for Insurance Business" (JPI/GPI 3) 
and "Guldellnes on Mathematical Estimation of IBNR Claims Provision" (JP!/ 
GPI 12). 
12"Gutdelines to Control Operating Costs of General Insurance Business" (JPI/ 
GP 2). 
13"Guidellnes on Operating Costs of Life Insurance Business" (JPI/GPI 6 
[Revised)). 
1•see "Guidelines on Motor Premium Loadings" (JPI/GPI 4). 
15Annual Report of the Director General of Insurance: 1991, pp. 75-76; 1993. 
p. 81. 
16S.W. Caffin, op. cit. pp. 5, 8 and 10. 
17[bid. 
18See "Guidelines on the Scheme for Insurance on Large and Sp clallz d 
Risks" (JPI/GPI 11). 
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